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 2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Together with prudential capital requirements, loan loss provisions (LLPs) are crucial to 
transmit macroeconomic conditions to real economy as they affect bank performance and incentives 
to issue new loans. How bank managers decide their provisioning policies has attracted many 
researchers in the banking field especially because they merge different information and behaviors. 
LLPs are usually classified as either specific or general. The former, also known as non-
discretionary provisions, depend on expected future losses and are added to specific reserves 
(Whalen, 1994; Beaver & Engle, 1996). General provisions, also called discretionary, increase 
generic reserves to protect the bank against not yet unidentified losses. General provisions are 
judgmental and can be used to pursue different management objectives. In particular, LLPs can be 
manipulated to meet minimum capital requirements and/or to improve the market’s perception by 
stabilizing their banks’ income (income smoothing). 
Recent literature has emphasized the relationship between LLPs and bank capital 
requirements with the credit cycle. Low specific provisions during expansion periods push banks to 
grant new loans while their incentives to supply new credits decrease during downturns, when 
banks are constrained to set aside a larger amount of provisions. Furthermore, it becomes harder to 
meet prudential capital requirements and banks become more likely to reduce their lending activity. 
The pro-cyclical nature of both capital requirements and provisioning rules calls for greater 
collaboration between accounting setters and banking regulators and supervisors, especially after 
the 2007 crisis.  
Based on these issues and motivated by the debate on the opportunity of a stricter banking 
regulation (i.e., Basel III counter-cyclical buffer) and supervision (i.e., European Banking Authority 
(EBA) stress tests), this research investigates whether bank managers’ incentives to discretionally 
use LLPs have been affected by the crisis erupted in 2007. In particular, we analyze during the 
period 2005-2011 a representative sample of Euro Area banks, by detecting potentially different 
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 3 
behaviors of listed banks and of banks subject to the EBA 2010 and 2011 stress tests. The 
consequences of the crisis on US bank managers’ provisioning policies have been recently 
investigated by El Sood (2012), whereas, to the best of our knowledge, the effects on European 
banks have not been investigated yet. Overall, our purpose is twofold: first, to provide new evidence 
to the conflicting results of previous literature, by focusing on provisioning policies during stressed 
market conditions; second, to investigate whether a completely new form of stricter supervision 
(i.e., the EBA stress tests) during the crisis period may also affect the discretionary use of LLPs. To 
date, this latter issue in particular has never been studied before. The crisis severely affected loan 
portfolio quality and earnings of Euro Area banks and might have reduced the incentives to manage 
income and regulatory capital via LLPs, due to the increase of specific/non-discretionary provisions 
as they are inversely correlated with bank loans quality. Nevertheless, because of the decline in 
their credit portfolio quality and higher incentives to shift risk (Fonseca & Gonzales, 2008), banks’ 
regulatory capital ratios decreased during the crisis. Moreover, a stricter supervision, as that 
imposed by EBA amidst the crisis through the 2010 and 2011 stress testing exercises, required 
banks to be resilient to stressed scenarios and imposed more pressure on bank managers’ decisions.  
Based on a panel data analysis, our empirical evidence shows that banks tended to smooth 
income but not to influence regulatory capital via LLPs. In particular, incentives to smooth income 
increased after the crisis, irrespective of the different nature of public and private.  
As to the behavior of banks that underwent the EBA stress tests, we observe that the 
disclosure of the 2011 test results together with the release of a detailed set of sensitive information 
is associated with more income smoothing by tested banks, as they need to stabilize their income in 
order to improve the market’s perception of their risk. This may be interpreted as an unwilled side 
effect that both accounting and banking regulators and supervisors should carefully take into 
account. To mitigate possible concerns about endogeneity issues, we also run a GMM estimation 
and find that our results are qualitatively unchanged. As robustness checks, we test our hypotheses 
excluding Spanish and Greek banks due to the specific provisioning mechanism adopted in Spain 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 4 
and the extremely difficult financial and economic conditions in Greece during our investigation 
period. Overall, this research confirms the need for a better coordination of accounting setters and 
supervisory authorities’ actions. Our findings can contribute to set accounting and prudential 
regulations that can more effectively pursue their specific objectives. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we analyze the rationale for discretionary use 
of LLPs and develop our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data, sample selection and 
outlines methodological aspects of this study. Section 4 provides a discussion of our findings. 
Section 5 checks the robustness of our results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and research hypotheses  
 
This section presents main contributions on loan loss provisioning in the banking literature, 
for both listed and unlisted credit institutions, and on the effect of the release of EBA stress tests 
results. Based on this literature, we develop our research hypotheses concerning income smoothing 
and capital management and also make assumptions about the impact of stricter supervision on the 
discretionary use of LLPs. 
 
2.1. Income smoothing  
 
Under ordinary economic conditions, banks can manipulate LLPs to reduce their net profit 
volatility, improve investors’, regulators’ and supervisors’ risk perception and keep their 
compensation and the dividends flow to the shareholders stable over time. Prior studies 
investigating bank income smoothing via LLPs in the US, both before and after the Basel I Capital 
Accord came into force, find inconclusive evidence (Beatty, Chamberlain & Magliolo, 1995; 
Collins, Shackelford & Wahlen, 1995; Bhat, 1996; Ahmed, Takeda & Thomas, 1999). As to non-
US banking systems, the empirical evidence is mixed as well. Anandarajan, Hasan, and McCarthy 
(2007) find that Australian commercial banks manipulate provisions to smooth their income, while 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) show that European commercial and cooperative banks reduce their 
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 5 
provisions if earnings before taxes and provisions raise. Evidence from Pérez, Salas-Fumas, and 
Saurina (2008) and Shrieves and Dahl (2003) supports income smoothing for Spanish and Japanese 
commercial banks, respectively. Evidence referred to Asian emerging markets does not univocally 
support the earnings smoothing hypothesis as well (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; Craig, Davis, & 
Pascual, 2006; Packer & Zhu, 2012). 
To reduce earnings volatility and financial markets’ risk perception, publicly traded banks 
might have stronger incentives in smoothing their income, if compared to unlisted banks (Nichols, 
Wahlen, & Wieland, 2009). Accordingly, Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) show that a higher number 
of stakeholders makes listed banks more engaged in income smoothing. According to Anandarajan 
et al. (2007), publicly traded banks use income to signal success and strength to their shareholders, 
since they raise funds in the stock market. However, Fonseca and Gonzales (2008) suggest that 
listed banks are less likely to smooth income because they are subject to a stricter supervision 
because of their larger size and greater impact in the case of a banking crisis. 
To the best of our knowledge, banks’ income smoothing during adverse financial market 
conditions has not been fully investigated yet. El Sood (2012) finds that during the crisis US banks 
use provisions to smooth income upward. According to Packer and Zhu (2012) the global financial 
crisis has significantly increased income smoothing practice only for Indian banks, but not for the 
rest of the Asian banking systems that they take into account. Multiple factors might affect bank 
managers’ provisioning decisions under stressed economic conditions. The crisis might limit the 
scope for a discretionary use of banks’ provisions because of the increasing and massive 
deterioration in the quality of their loans and the associated increase in the share of specific LLPs. 
Nevertheless, the peculiar features of the turmoil originated by a toxic assets contagion in the 
financial markets in the 2007 might have created incentives to shift risk and consequently smooth 
income, for both private and listed banks. As a result, during the crisis banks might be more 
engaged in income smoothing relative to the pre-crisis period (Hypothesis 1), especially if they are 
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 6 
publicly traded as they have higher incentives in reporting stable income numbers, especially during 
extremely volatile periods (Hypothesis 2).  
 
H1: The relationship between loan loss provisions and earnings before provisions and taxes is 
more positive during the crisis. 
H2: The relationship between loan loss provisions and earnings before provisions and taxes is 
more positive for listed banks than private banks during the crisis. 
 
2.2. Capital management  
 
By manipulating LLPs bank managers can avoid the cost of violating prudential regulation 
on bank capital adequacy. According to the Basel II Capital Accord, which was in force during the 
investigation period, the Tier1 capital includes retained earnings, implying that banks characterized 
by a low capital endowment might have more incentives to make lower LLPs. Nevertheless, if 
banks’ loan loss reserves are lower than 1.25% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs), an increase in 
provisions raises the Tier2 capital and, overall, the total regulatory capital ratio (BCBS, 2006). The 
sign of the relation between provisions and regulatory capital will derive from which of these two 
effects predominates and empirical evidence is not conclusive (Ahmed et al., 1999; Pérez et al., 
2008; Craig et al., 2006; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Leventis, 
Dimitropoulos & Anandarajan, 2011). 
We expect low-capital banks to be characterized by higher incentives to use LLPs to manage 
their capital after the crisis broke out (Hypothesis 3), because both the worsening macroeconomic 
scenario and the rising counterparty risk exposures have increased banks probability of default. 
Furthermore, the associated costs of violating capital requirements increase in distressed economic 
conditions because raising capital is more expensive and reducing the risk weighted assets could 
force them to close profitable customer relationships and/or sell assets at unfavourable conditions. 
Because of the greater use of the stock market as source of funds, listed banks are expected to be 
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 7 
more willing to meet capital requirements and are more likely to manage their capital ratios 
(Hypothesis 4). 
 
H3: The relationship between loan loss provisions and primary capital (Tier1 capital) is y 
more positive during the crisis 
H4: The relation between loan loss provisions and primary capital (Tier1 capital) is more 
positive for listed banks than private banks during the crisis. 
 
2.3. Supervisory stress testing and discretionary use of LLPs 
 
The effectiveness of banking regulation and supervision in preventing managers from 
excessive risk-taking behaviour might create incentives to use LLPs for income smoothing and 
capital management purposes (Fonseca & Gonzales, 2008). In this regard, EBA 2010 and 2011 
stress tests offer a privileged context to investigate these issues. By assuming EBA stress tests are 
an example of supervisory intervention that can severely affect managerial discretion in making 
provisions, we use them as an empirical experiment to detect whether stricter supervision during the 
crisis provides a disciplining effect on managers’ decisions and makes bank provisioning policies 
less prone to pursue discretionary objectives.  
Additionally, from a disclosure perspective, we also might expect banks that underwent 
EBA stress testing exercises to be more constrained in manipulating LLPs, due to the greater release 
of bank-specific information that stress tests both require and make public. In fact, on the one hand, 
sensitive data are needed by the national authorities responsible to feed the what-if scenarios 
generation process and, on the other hand, results of stress tests are published on an aggregated 
basis, as in 2010, or referred to each single bank, as in 2011.  
Therefore, we expect EBA exercises to make banks less likely to use LLPs to smooth their 
income (Hypothesis 5). As for the capital management hypothesis, we suggest that another effect 
can prevail over the disciplining effect: since the EBA exercises focus on capital adequacy under 
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 8 
stressed macroeconomic scenarios, tested banks might have more pronounced incentives to 
manipulate LLPs to avoid the costs associated with failing the supervisory assessment (Hypothesis 
6).  
H5: The relationship between loan loss provisions and earnings before taxes and provisions 
is less positive for banks under supervisory stress test than for un-tested banks. 
H6: The relationship between loan loss provisions and Tier1 capital is more positive for 
banks under supervisory stress test than for un-tested banks. 
A main assumption behind these hypotheses is that banks’ managers care about the results 
of the EBA tests. Some recent research papers have investigated the informative content of the 
stress testing exercises, particularly focusing on their impact on banks’ stock price. Beltratti (2011) 
finds that, by making public details about each bank capital shortfall, the 2011 EBA stress test 
provided sensitive information to the market. Based on the analysis of market reaction on the stress 
tests’ announcement dates, Cardinali and Nordmark (2011) show that investors cared little for the 
2010 stress test, whereas they had a negative reaction to the release of the 2011 methodology, with 
no effect on on un-tested credit institutions. By focusing on price changes upon the disclosure of the 
2011 results, Petrella and Resti (2013) show that on the results date the market reacted strongly to 
the disclosure of detailed information, thus corroborating the hypothesis that the stress test exercise 
mitigates bank opaqueness. Goldstein and Sapra (2011) find that the higher disclosure of the 2011 
exercise results led to different market reactions relative to the release of aggregate information 
following the 2010 exercise because market participants had also information on the related drivers. 
The different informative content of the two stress tests might also lead to different results in terms 
of their impact on the discretionary use of LLPs. Particularly, due to the larger market reaction to 
the results of the 2011 stress test, bank managers might have had more incentives to smooth income 
to improve market perception of their banks’ risk. This would have been crucial to raise new capital 
during the turbulent next years and might have led, contrary to what stated in Hypothesis 5, to a 
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 9 
more positive relationship between loan loss provisions and earnings before taxes and provisions in 
2011. 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis  
 
3.1 Sample selection  
 
We collect Euro Area banks’ IAS-compliant balance-sheet data referred to the 2005 – 2011 
period from Bankscope. To build our sample we adopt the following constraints. First, we focus on 
banks that are significantly involved in traditional lending activity, i.e. with customer loans higher 
than 50% of total assets over the sample period. To reduce size-related bias, we do not consider 
banks whose average asset value over the entire sample period is lower than the second quartile of 
the average asset distribution of the entire sample. Our initial sample is made up of banks that are 
from the 21 European countries included in the 2010 and 2011 EBA stress tests. To ensure 
consistency in our analyses, we only keep banks with data available for more than five. Finally, to 
address potential issues with outliers, we eliminate the extreme bank/year observations (i.e., 
observations for which a variable presents values lower than the 1
st
 percentile and higher than the 
99
th
 percentile).  
The final sample is an unbalanced panel of annual data of 1,232 bank-year observations. and 
comprises a number of banks ranging from 114 in 2005 to 205 in 2007, 2008 and 2009. Among 
them, the number of listed banks goes from 35 in the first and the last year of the observation period 
to 42 in 2007, 2008 and 2009. In order to avoid potential biases related to listing or delisting 
decisions, we delete banks whose stocks were delisted or began to trade during the sample period. 
Our sample includes 30 out of 91 credit institutions that were subject to the 2010 stress test 
exercise, of which 28 were tested in the 2011 stress test as well.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
3.2.1. Testing for the discretionary use of LLPs during the crisis 
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The first objective of this research is to test whether the financial crisis affected banks’ 
discretionary use of LLPs with regards to the hypotheses of income smoothing practice and capital 
management. Our analysis is close to El Sood (2012), even if we focus on the potentially different 
behavior of both listed and stress tested banks’ behavior and adopt estimation techniques that better 
account for the dataset dynamic nature. To test our H1 and H3 hypotheses, we use the following 
model: 
 
tititi
tititjtititi
TIERCRISISaEBTPCRISISa
TIERaEBTPaGDPGRaLOANaNPLaaLLP
,,7,6
,5,4,3,2,10,
1
1


 (1) 
 
LLPi,t , is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets for bank i at time t. The variables 
employed as predictors have been largely used to test for the discretionary use of LLPs. Prior 
research captures the non-discretionary component of LLPs using variables reflecting both the level 
and the dynamics of loan portfolio losses (see, among others,  Bouvatier & Lepetit 2008; Fonseca & 
Gonzàles 2008; Anandarajan et al. 2007; Ahmed et al. 1999). Particularly, we use the variable 
NPLi,t , the ratio of non-performing loans divided by total assets . This variable is positively related 
to loan loss provisions. Our proxy for the discretionary component of LLPs is the variable LOANi,t , 
which is equal to customer loans divided by total assets. The variable GDPGRj,t corresponds to the 
annual growth rate of the gross domestic product at constant prices for the country j at year t and is 
expected to capture the pro-cyclicality in LLPs due to macroeconomic conditions (Fonseca & 
Gonzàlez 2008; Anandarajan et al. 2007; Anandarajan et al. 2007; Bikker & Metzemakers 2005;  
Laeven & Majnoni 2003). Since banks are expected to reduce provisions to increase their income 
and/or capital during worsening macroeconomic conditions, we hypothesize a negative coefficient 
of the variable GDPGRj,t.  
Based on prior literature (see, among others, Leventis et al. 2011; Bouvatier & Lepetit 2008; 
Anandarajan et al. 2007; Ahmed et al. 1999), to detect income smoothing, we use the variable 
EBTPi,t , defined as the ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions for bank i at time t 
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divided by total assets. Should the coefficient of EBTPi,t be positive, low- (high-) income banks 
would decrease (increase) provisions.  
To test for the use of LLPs for capital management purpose, prior research focuses on the 
ratio of actual regulatory capital divided by the regulatory minimum capital (see Ahmed et al.1999; 
Beatty et al. 1995;, Leventis et al. 2011), or  (as Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008) on  a variable based 
on the quartiles of the total capital ratio distribution. We opt for the ratio of Tier1 capital to risk 
weighted assets (TIER1i,t), for two main reasons. First, it does not suffer from the influence of 
accounting relations on the link between bank capital and LLPs, that is due to the negative 
correlation between provisions and Tier1 capital and to the positive correlation between provisions 
and Tier 2. Secondly, relative to Tier 2, the definition of Tier1 capital measure is more 
homogeneous across the national supervisory standards. We argue that banks with less capital may 
have lower incentives to set provisions aside in order to increase their primary regulatory capital 
endowment via retained earnings. Hence, the capital management hypothesis is supported if the 
coefficient of TIER1i,t is positive. 
Finally, we consider an indicator variable, CRISIS, equal to 1 for the period 2008-2011, and 
0 otherwise. Thus, we can generate two interaction terms CRISIS●EBTPi,t and CRISIS●TIER1i,t. to 
investigate differences in banks’ use of LLPs in the two periods. Based on the Hypotheses 1 and 3, 
these variables coefficients are expected to be both positive. 
 
 
3.2.2. Testing for LLPs discretionary use by listed banks  
 
 Potential differences in listed banks’ behaviour relative to unlisted credit institutions are 
estimated through the model presented in the following equation (2), where, relative to equation (1), 
we add four interaction terms: 
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First, the two interaction terms LISTED●EBTPi,t and LISTED●TIER1i,t are generated by 
interacting our key variables with an indicator variable, LISTED, equal to 1 for listed banks and 0 
otherwise. These interaction terms allow us to examine whether, overall, listed credit institutions 
use LLPs to smooth income and manage capital at a larger extent than unlisted banks. If coefficients 
α8 and α10 of equation (2) were positive, that would be the case. Furthermore, to specifically test for 
the Hypotheses 2 and 4, according to which, listed banks are even more willing to report stable 
income numbers and more likely to be engaged in capital management practice during the crisis, we 
generate the two two-way interaction variables, LISTED●EBTPi,t●CRISIS and 
LISTED●TIER1i,t●CRISIS. Should their coefficients α9 and α11 be positive, Hypotheses 2 and 4 
would be confirmed. 
 
 
3.2.3. Testing for LLPs discretionary use by EBA stress tested banks 
 
According to the Hypotheses 5 and 6, we expect banks that underwent the EBA’s stress tests 
to be less involved in the income smoothing practice but more engaged in manipulating capital. To 
test for these hypotheses, we estimate the following model: 
 
tititi
titi
ti
titititi
titititjtititi
DYTIERTESTEDEBAaDYTIERTESTEDEBAa
DYEBTPTESTEDEBAaDYEBTPTESTEDEBAa
DYTESTEDEBAaDYTESTEDEBAaCRISISTIERLISTEDa
TIERLISTEDaCRISISEBTPLISTEDaEBTPLISTEDaTIERCRISISa
EBTPCRISISaTIERaEBTPaGDPGRaLOANaNPLaaLLP
,,17,16
,15,14
1312,11
,10,9,8,7
,6,5,4,3,2,10,
20101_20101_
2011_2010_
2011_2010_1
11
1





 (3) 
 
Relative to equation (2), we first interact the sample binary variable EBA_TESTED, that 
equals 1 if bank i participated in at least one of the two EBA stress tests and 0 otherwise, with the 
two dummies DY2010 and DY2011, equal to 1 if the observation year is 2010 and 2011, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise. A positive (negative) sign for their coefficients α12 and α13 in 
equation (3) would entail that, compared to banks that were not subject to EBA stress tests, tested 
banks set a greater (smaller) amount of provisions aside at the end of the year in which they were 
included in the EBA stress test exercise, relative to the rest of the years included in the sample 
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period. Furthermore, we generate other two-way interaction variables, 
EBA_TESTED●EBTPi,t●DY2010, EBA_TESTED●EBTPi,t●DY2011, 
EBA_TESTED●TIER1i,t●DY2010, and EBA_TESTED●TIER1i,t●DY2011, to investigate 
differences between tested and untested banks for each of the years of the EBA stress tests. 
Particularly, the Hypothesis 5, according to which tested banks are expected to be less involved in 
income smoothing, would be confirmed for 2010 and/or 2011 if coefficients α14 and/or α15 in 
equation (3) were negative. The assumption of a more aggressive involvement in capital 
management practices, which is stated in Hypothesis 6, would be supported by the empirical 
evidence referred to 2010 and/or 2011 if coefficients α16 and/or α17 in equation (3) were positive. 
Based on the variables formerly included in equation (2), we also control for the evidence on tested 
banks being driven by the public nature of most of them. The following Table 1 summarizes labels, 
name and description of the variables used to test our hypotheses. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Main descriptive statistics referred to our sample banks are shown in Table 2. The average 
value of the variable LLP is slightly higher than 0.43%, confirming that provisions for loan losses 
are a relatively important bank accrual. On average, NPL is 3.46% and, as expected, experiences an 
increasing trend over the analysis time period. Customer loans are almost 72% of total assets, 
confirming the traditional nature of the business that our sample banks run and remains quite stable 
over time. EBTP is on average 3.17% and it shows a markedly decreasing trend over the six-year 
time horizon we take into account. The variable measuring banks’ endowment of primary 
regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets, is almost 10.6, well above the minimum required 
by both the Basel 2 Capital Accord in force during the investigation period, and the incoming Basel 
3 new set of rules. In particular, it shows an increasing trend that reflects banks’ efforts to improve 
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the quality of their regulatory capital, both in line with national and international authorities’ 
responses to the crisis, and also anticipates the new Basel III framework that the BCBS was setting 
just in those years. 
We detect differences between listed and unlisted banks and stress-tested and untested banks 
and show that the respective means are statistically different for all the variables. Particularly, as 
expected, on average, publicly traded banks are larger than private ones and are less involved in 
lending activity. Even if they are characterized by a better credit quality, which may be largely 
explained by the greater diversification opportunities due to their larger size, listed banks tend to set 
a greater amount of loan loss provisions aside, entailing a more prudent approach to credit risk 
management. These results are probably due to the market disciplining effect. Publicly traded banks 
are less profitable than private banks. This can be the consequence of the higher customer loans 
share of total assets of the latter. In fact, if issued to sufficiently risky counterparties, customer loans 
can be much more profitable than other bank assets. This would also be consistent with the higher 
average value of TIER1 for unlisted banks: a larger amount of primary regulatory capital 
endowment has to protect them against a greater risk exposure. 
Our main variables show statistically different means even when tested banks are compared 
to untested banks. Particularly, the former are less profitable, less involved in the traditional lending 
activity, are characterized by both lower Tier1 capital ratios and a less non-performing loans. Not 
surprisingly, these results are similar to those highlighted before in comparing listed and unlisted 
banks and can be mainly explained by the larger average size of tested banks. Nevertheless, 
contrary to what found in the comparison between listed and unlisted banks, the difference in the 
mean values of LLP between tested and untested banks is not statistically significant. 
  
[Table 2 here] 
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Descriptive statistics reported in Table 3 are calculated by distinguishing between the years 
preceding the 2008 (pre-crisis years) and the period 2008 – 2011 (crisis years). As expected, the 
entire sample and the two groups of listed and tested banks set a greater amount of loan loss 
provisions aside after the crisis broke out, with statistically significant differences in means. This is 
consistent with the statistically significant increase in the average value of NPL for, again, the 
whole sample, publicly traded and tested banks. Mainly due to the greater amount of provisions 
made after the eruption of the crisis, we find a statistically significant decline in EBTP for both the 
whole sample and the group of listed banks. EBTP decreased also for tested banks, but the mean 
value referred to the pre-crisis period is not statistically different from the value of the crisis period. 
The average LOAN systematically increased, though the difference in means between the two 
periods is statistically significant only when we consider the entire sample banks. Consistently with 
the increasing risk in banks’ credit portfolio, the average value of TIER1 went up for the entire 
sample, listed and tested banks, being in all the three cases above the minimum prudential 
requirement in force during the investigation period. The differences in means between the two 
periods is always statistically significant. The variable measuring bank size increased not only for 
the total sample, but also for listed and tested bank in the crisis period, though the difference in 
means is statistically significant only for listed banks. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 provides correlations of our variables. NPL, LOAN, and EBTP have a significant 
and positive association with LLP for the entire sample, listed and tested banks. The correlations of 
GDPGR and TA with LLP are both negative and statistically significant. Finally, as concerns the 
correlation between TIER1 and LLP, it is negative and significant for the whole sample, positive for 
both listed and tested banks, but significant only for the latter. Overall, based on the low 
correlations between the regressors, we can exclude cases of multicollinearity.  
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[Table 4 here] 
 
4. Results 
 
Panel data analysis is a very efficient tool and allows us to consider the unobservable and 
constant heterogeneity, i.e. each bank specific characteristics. Based on the Hausman test, we adopt 
fixed effects to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3). Our results are presented in Table 5.  
Evidence from equation (1) in Table 5 suggests that banks smooth their income via LLPs 
more intensively during the crisis (
4a is positive and statistically significant). This result supports 
our H1 hypothesis and is consistent with the evidence reported in El Sood (2012) for a sample of 
US banks. We do not find any significant difference in our banks’ behavior in terms of capital 
management (hypothesis H3) during the period 2008 – 2011 (the coefficient of CRISIS●TIER1 is 
not statistically significant). These findings are confirmed in the specifications of equations (2) and 
(3). 
None of the terms interacting the dummy LISTED with our key variables is statistically 
significant. Therefore, listed banks do not appear to behave differently from private banks during 
the crisis. The absence of differences in income smoothing practice is not in line with Anandarajan 
et al. (2007), whose evidence is referred to Australian banks over the period 1991 – 2001. 
Since prior literature has argued about the differences, in terms of informative content and 
market reaction, between the two EBA exercises, in equation (3) we test for our hypotheses in the 
2010 and 2011 separately. First, we find that banks subject to stress tests make significantly less 
provisions in 2011 relative to untested institutions (EBA_TESTED●DY2011 is negative and 
statistically significant). Secondly, tested banks engaged more in income smoothing in 2011 
(EBA_TESTED●EBTP●DY2011 is positive and statistically significant). The coefficients of the 
variables referred to the year 2010 (EBA_TESTED●DY2010 and 
EBA_TESTED●EBTP●DY2010) and those of the variables used to test for the capital management 
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hypothesis for both 2010 and 2011 (EBA_TESTED●TIER1●DY2010 and 
EBA_TESTED●TIER1●DY2011) are not statistically significant. Overall, based on these results, 
neither of the two Hypotheses 5 and 6 is supported. Particularly, the evidence of more income 
smoothing by tested banks in 2011 is in contrast with our Hypothesis 5, according to which the 
disciplining effect of the stress tests should lower incentives to manage income via LLPs. 
Nevertheless, it can be interpreted based on the impact that the different types of release of the 
stress tests results had on the market and on managers’ behavior. Contrary to what occurred for the 
publication of the results in 2010, market response to the publication of the 2011 stress test results 
was large and led managers to use LLPs to smooth income in order to ultimately improve market 
perception of their banks’ risk. Furthermore, the more aggressive income smoothing that we 
observe for the year 2011 might also be due to perceived bankruptcy concerns for some of the 
tested banks. 
Overall, our results support the income smoothing hypothesis at the 1% confidence level. 
However, contrary to what is required for the capital management hypothesis to be confirmed, the 
coefficient of the Tier1 capital ratio is always negative and economically not relevant, being also 
marginally significant at the 10% confidence level only for equations 1 and 2. 
As to the control variables used in our models, we find that the l GDPGR is negatively and 
significantly associated with the LLP at 1% confidence level, for all the three estimated equations. 
This suggests that banks make provisions during and not before economic recessions. The pro-
cyclical nature of our banks’ behavior is consistent with previous empirical research. The 
coefficient of NPL is positive and statistically significant for all the equations shown in Table 5 at 
the 1% confidence level, confirming the direct relation between LLPs and credit quality. Customer 
loans are negatively correlated with loan loss provisions but the coefficient of the variable LOAN is 
neither statistically nor economically significant.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
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5. Robustness checks 
 
The robustness of our results is tested through the following checks. First, banks from Spain 
and Greece are removed from the sample, because of the especially distressed situation of these two 
countries’ banking sectors during the investigation period. Among the eight banks that failed the 
2011 stress test, five were from Spain and two from Greece, and many other intermediaries in these 
two countries were very close to fail the test. Since these banks might have behaved on the basis of 
peculiar incentives, we decide to remove them from the sample to test if our results are biased by 
their inclusion. Furthermore, we eliminate Spanish banks also because of the specific regulatory 
constraints imposed on their provisioning policies by the Banco de España since 2000, i.e., the 
dynamic provisioning system. Based on dynamic provisioning requirements, Spanish banks are 
required to make provisions in periods of economic expansions so that they can be used during 
economic downturns. It is worth highlighting that this mechanism automatically implies income 
smoothing and aims to induce banks’ countercyclical behavior in their provisioning practice, by 
also generally reducing managerial discretion.  
Table 6 shows the results obtained after dropping Spanish and Greek banks from the sample. 
The variable CRISIS●EBTP is marginally significant at the 10% confidence level, showing a 
decrease in its statistical significance if compared to the analysis of the whole sample (see Table 5). 
By dropping Spanish banks, therefore, we get rid of banks that can significantly contribute to the 
result of more income smoothing during the crisis, since they are forced by law to smooth their 
income over time. The capital management hypothesis is still not confirmed: the coefficient of the 
variable TIER1 is again negative and not economically significant, even if statistically significant. 
The empirical evidence referred to listed banks does not support the hypothesis of a different 
behavior, if compared to private intermediaries, neither for the income smoothing nor for the capital 
management hypothesis, for both the overall period (LISTED●EBTP and LISTED●TIER1 are not 
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statistically significant) and during the crisis (LISTED●EBTP●CRISIS and 
LISTED●TIER1●CRISIS continue to be statistically not significant). Finally, the coefficient of 
EBA_TESTED●EBTP●DY2011 in equation (3) is statistically significant at the 10% confidence 
level, whereas it was at the 5% for the overall sample. Consistently with what highlighted before, 
dropping Spanish banks makes its coefficient less statistically significant. As expected, and already 
shown in Table 5, LLP is again positively and significantly correlated with the variables NPL and 
EBTP at the 1% confidence level, and negatively and significantly at the 1% confidence level with 
the annual real GDP growth rate. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
The second robustness check is based on the use of the two-step system GMM estimation 
technique for dynamic models (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bover, 1995). We adopt this 
technique to deal with a potential simultaneity issue affecting the determination of both some 
independent variables and LLP. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and 
dynamic endogeneity (if any), first-differences of the variables are used as instruments for the 
equations in levels. Results are presented in Table 7
1
. We implement a finite sample correction 
following Windmeijer (2005), as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). Based on Hansens’ test 
and Arellano and Bond (1991), respectively, we do not have issues concerning instrument validity 
and serially uncorrelated error terms.  
Overall, the two-step system GMM estimates show that our main results are confirmed at 
the usual confidence levels. All the control variables have the expected sign as in the GLS fixed 
effects analysis but LOAN is negatively and significantly related to LLP, suggesting that banks with 
larger credit portfolio make less provisions.  
 
                                                 
1
 We use the Roodman ‘xtabond2’ module in Stata to obtain the system GMM estimates. Please refer to Roodman 
(2009). 
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[Table 7 here] 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We investigate the discretionary use of LLPs by Euro Area commercial banks over the 
2005-2011 time period. In particular, we examine banks’ behavior in relation to: i) the distressed 
economic and financial conditions experienced during the crisis and ii) the two stress test exercises 
that the European Banking Authority run in 2010 and 2011. Studying banks managers’ decisions 
under such extraordinary conditions can give useful insights for a deeper understanding of actual 
provisioning practices. 
Overall, Euro Area banks used provisions to smooth income, but not to manage their capital 
for regulatory purpose, and were more aggressively involved in income smoothing after the 
financial crisis broke out. This can reasonably be due to more pronounced incentives to enhance 
investors’ perception. Moreover, we analyze banks’ behavior by separately testing for the 
discretionary use of LLPs for each of the two years of the stress tests (2010 and 2011) since prior 
literature pointed out significant differences between the two exercises in terms of their informative 
content and market response.  
Contrary to our initial expectations, the capital management hypothesis is supported for 
neither 2010 nor 2011. As to the earnings management, we observe that tested banks make 
significantly less provisions and are more involved in income smoothing, relative to untested 
institutions only in 2011. We argue that the results may be due to the different type of release of the 
stress tests results. The strong market response to the 2011 test results might have led banks to 
manage income via loan loss provisions, balancing the presumed disciplining effect of the tests, 
because of higher incentives to increase the market’s confidence, if compared to untested 
intermediaries. Our results on this specific issue contribute to the debate on the opportunity to 
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disclose stress tests results, by providing evidence of an unwilled side effect that regulators and 
supervisors, as well as accounting setters, should carefully take into account.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Variables definitions. 
Notation Variable name Description 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
LLP Loan loss provisions The ratio of loan loss provision to total assets  
Panel B: Income smoothing and capital management variables 
EBTP Earnings before taxes and 
provisions 
The ratio of earnings before taxes and provisions to total 
assets  
 
TIER1 Basel II Tier1 capital ratio Tier1 capital divided by risk weighted assets  
 
Panel C: Control variables 
GDPGR GDP growth rate The GDP growth rate on a year-to-year basis 
 
LOAN Customer loans Customer loans divided by total assets 
NPL Non-performing loans Non-performing loans divided by total assets 
TA Total asset Natural logarithm of total asset 
Panel D: Dummy variables 
DY Year dummies Six dummy variables which equal either one or zero for each 
year from 2006 to 2011, excluding the year 2005  
CRISIS Crisis dummy An indicator variable that is 1 for years 2008 – 2011 and 0 
otherwise 
 
LISTED Listed banks dummy An indicator variable that is one for listed banks and 0 
otherwise 
EBA_TESTED Tested banks dummy An indicator variable that is 1 for banks that underwent EBA 
stress tests and 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table
2 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics – Part 1. 
 
Whole sample  
 
Listed  
 
Unlisted  
 
Listed vs. 
Unlisted 
EBA_tested  EBA_untested  
EBA_tested 
vs. 
EBA_untested 
 
Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
Difference  
in means  
(p-value) 
Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
Difference  
in means  
(p-value) 
LLP 
0.004323 0.005182 0.004076 0.001106*** 0.0046728 0.004255 0.000417 
(0.003052) (0.003681) (0.002799) (0.0000) (0.0039108) (0.002855) (0.7725) 
NPL 
0.034565 0.031564 0.035427 -0.003862*** 0.0256079 0.036279 -0.010671*** 
(0.023739) (0.025019) (0.023301) (0.0014) (0.0227986) (0.023539) (0.0000) 
LOAN 
0.716611 0.664797 0.731501 -0.066704*** 0.6641996 0.726647 -0.062448*** 
(0.139868) (0.139993) (0.136306) (0.0000) (0.1233164) (0.140660) (0.0000) 
EBTP 
0.031737 0.029350 0.032423 -0.003073*** 0.0257899 0.032875 -0.007086*** 
(0.009517) (0.008581) (0.009665) (0.0000) (0.007839) (0.009387) (0.0000) 
TIER1 (%) 
10.581780 8.822800 11.087230 -2.26443*** 9.485253 10.79175 -1.306497*** 
(3.541986) (2.055214) (3.714584) (0.0000) (2.190063) (3.70959) (0.0001) 
TA 
15.977610 17.85547 15.438 2.41747*** 18.74594 15.44751 3.29843*** 
(2.051677) (1.624509) (1.832486) (0.0000) (1.419729) (1.697532) (0.0000) 
N. obs. 1,232 275 957 - 198 1,034 - 
This table reports descriptive statistics, referred to the period 2005 – 2011, for all sample banks (column 2), listed vs. 
unlisted banks (columns 3 and 4, respectively), EBA tested vs. untested banks (columns 6 and 7, respectively). The p-
values of the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are reported. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ express significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 
See Table 1 for the variables definitions. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics – Part 2.  
  All banks Listed banks EBA_tested banks 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis 
Difference 
in means 
Pre-crisis Crisis 
Difference 
in means 
Pre-EBA 
tests 
EBA tests years 
Difference 
in means 
 
Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
(p-value) 
Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
(p-value) 
Mean 
(sd) 
Mean 
(sd) 
(p-value) 
LLP 
  
0.002928 0.005310  -0.002382*** 0.003231 0.006625  -0.003393*** 0.003767 0.006534  -0.002766*** 
(0.002030) (0.003263) (0.0000) (0.002209) (0.003887) (0.0000)  (0.003314) (0.004611)  (0.0000) 
NPL 
  
0.023835 0.042168  -0.0183338*** 0.021682 0.038881  -0.017198*** 0.017836 0.041948  -0.024112*** 
(0.017828) (0.024469)  (0.0000) (0.020511) (0.025591)  (0.0000) (0.015576) (0.028945) (0.0000)  
LOAN 
  
0.705040 0.724811  -0.0197708*** 0.653313 0.673300 -0.019987 0.66272 0.671598 -0.008879 
(0.142284) (0.137640)  (0.0088) (0.140752) (0.139262)  (0.1270) (0.129411) (0.119825) (0.7017)  
EBTP 
  
0.034409 0.029843 0.004565*** 0.031196 0.027982 0.003213*** 0.025449 0.023982 0.001468 
(0.010352) (0.008382) (0.0000) (0.009254) (0.007797)  (0.0023) (0.007589) (0.006195)   (0.1533) 
TIER1 (%) 
  
9.719296 11.19305  -1.473754*** 8.024701 9.413797  -1.389096*** 8.879154 10.78607  -1.906916*** 
(3.389159) (3.522965)  (0.0000) (1.702401) (2.09860)  (0.0000) (1.994129) (2.122556)  (0.0000) 
TA 
  
15.91552 16.02162 -0.1061 17.6016 18.04345  -0.44185** 18.7485 18.91125 -0.16275 
(2.002233) (2.086272) (0.3752) (1.629461) (1.600107)  (0.0164) (1.448987) (1.441306)   (0.3361) 
N. obs. 511 721   117 158   130 56   
The table presents descriptive statistics of both the pre-crisis (2005 – 2008) and the crisis (2009 – 2011) periods for both all sample banks (columns 2 – 3) and listed banks 
(columns 5 – 6). It also shows descriptive statistics referred to both the years before the EBA stress tests and the two-year period 2010 – 2011 for tested banks (columns 8 – 9). 
The p-values of the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are reported. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ express significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 
See Table 1 for the variables definitions. 
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Table 4 
Sample correlations. 
Variables LLP GDPGR NPL LOAN EBTP TIER1 TA 
Panel A: all banks 
LLP 1 
      GDPGR  -0.3955*** 1 
     NPL 0.5247***  -0.2999*** 1 
    LOAN 0.3268***  -0.1154*** 0.3431*** 1 
   EBTP 0.1577*** 0.0325 0.2473*** 0.3291*** 1 
  TIER1  -0.0628**  -0.1300*** 0.2136*** -0.0418 0.0992*** 1 
 TA  -0.0585** 0.0880***  -0.3019***  -0.5135***  -0.4835***  -0.3439*** 1 
Panel B: listed banks 
LLP 1 
      GDPGR  -0.5586*** 1 
     NPL 0.6069***  -0.3689*** 1 
    LOAN 0.4095***  -0.1629*** 0.3375*** 1 
   EBTP 0.2392*** -0.0255 0.3079*** 0.4195*** 1 
  TIER1 0.1993***  -0.2253*** 0.2147*** -0.055 0.1157* 1 
 TA  -0.1661*** -0.0046  -0.2301***  -0.5168***  -0.4862***  -0.1232** 1 
Panel C: EBA tested banks 
LLP 1 
      GDPGR  -0.6081*** 1 
     NPL 0.6966***  -0.4414*** 1 
    LOAN 0.2656*** -0.114 0.1815** 1 
   EBTP 0.3716*** -0.038 0.2030*** 0.2978*** 1 
  TIER1 0.0628  -0.1638** 0.1143 0.0068 -0.1179 1 
 TA  -0.1652** 0.0075  -0.125*  -0.7152***  -0.2095*** -0.1028 1 
The table reports Pearson pair-wise correlation coefficients for whole sample banks (Panel A), listed banks 
(Panel B) and tested banks (Panel C). 
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%.  
See Table 1 for the variables definitions. 
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Table 5 
GLS fixed effect (FE) regression results of loan loss provisions. 
  Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) 
Variables/ratios Predicted sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates 
Constant  -0.000122 -0.10 0.000419 0.33 0.000585 -6.73 
GDPGR - -0.017876*** -6.67 -0.017111*** -6.77 -0.017143*** 8.38 
NPL + 0.079370*** 9.54 0.077992*** 9.51 0.075723*** -0.52 
LOAN ± -0.000777 -0.49 -0.000878 -0.56 -0.000817 5.10 
EBTP + 0.097247*** 5.13 0.101575*** 5.40 0.097310*** -1.64 
TIER1 + -0.000088* -1.83 -0.000083* -1.67 -0.000082 2.26 
CRISIS●EBTP + 0.030796*** 2.91 0.023978** 2.18 0.025138** -0.43 
CRISIS●TIER1 + -0.000016 -0.55 -0.000011 -0.33 -0.000014 -0.72 
LISTED●EBTP + - - -0.037457 -0.74 -0.034894 -0.84 
LISTED●EBTP●CRISIS + - - -0.017067 -0.56 -0.025147 -1.43 
LISTED●TIER1 + - - -0.000239 -1.26 -0.000259 1.83 
LISTED●TIER1●CRISIS + - - 0.000196 1.67 0.000208* -0.69 
EBA_TESTED●DY2010  - - - - -0.001360 -1.91 
EBA_TESTED●DY2011  - - - - -0.007660** 1.03 
EBA_TESTED●EBTP●DY2010 ± - - - - 0.062941 2.26 
EBA_TESTED●EBTP●DY2011 ± - - - - 0.203738** 0.62 
EBA_TESTED●TIER1●DY2010 ± - - - - 0.000063 1.08 
EBA_TESTED●TIER1●DY2011 ± - - - - 0.000291 0.46 
Panel B: Model fit     
F-statistics  84.57*** 59.96*** 51.21*** 
Within R
2   0,4869 0.5004 0.5082 
Between R
2   0,2489 0.1105 0.1092 
Overall R
2  0,3411 0.2294 0.2336 
Number of observations  1,232 1,232 1,232 
The table reports the results of the GLS fixed effect (FE) estimates of equations (1), (2) and (3). In each regression the dependent variable is LLP. 
28EBA_TESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if bank i is one of the 28 banks subject to both the 2010 and 2011, and 0 otherwise; DY2010 
(DY2011) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is referred to the year 2010 (2011), and 0 otherwise. See Table 1 for the other variables 
definition. T-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ express significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 
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Table 6 
GLS fixed effect (FE) regression results of loan loss provisions (excluding Spanish and Greek banks) 
  Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) 
Variables/ratios Predicted sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates 
Constant  -0.001380 -1.08 -0.000908 -0.70 -0.000665 -0.51 
GDPGR - -0.015466*** -6.55 -0.015174*** -6.61 -0.015774*** -6.65 
NPL + 0.087986*** 10.01 0.086954*** 10.18 0.085979*** 10.08 
LOAN ± -0.000237 -0.14 -0.000427 -0.25 -0.000396 -0.23 
EBTP + 0.099101*** 5.63 0.102007*** 5.27 0.097508*** 5.00 
TIER1 + -0.000092* -1.97 -0.000108** -2.12 -0.000108** -2.13 
CRISIS●EBTP + 0.019706* 1.82 0.019569* 1.76 0.020153* 1.81 
CRISIS●TIER1 + 0.000002 0.07 -0.000001 -0.02 -0.000007 -0.22 
LISTED●EBTP + - - -0.057119 -1.34 -0.057584 -1.30 
LISTED●EBTP●CRISIS + - - -0.024340 -0.76 -0.025743 -0.86 
LISTED●TIER1 + - - 0.000018 0.17 -0.000013 -0.13 
LISTED●TIER1●CRISIS + - - 0.000130 1.26 0.000130 1.35 
EBA_TESTED●DY2010  - - - - 0.003916 0.88 
EBA_TESTED●DY2011  - - - - -0.003944* -1.95 
EBA_TESTED●EBTP●DY2010 ± - - - - -0.117659 -0.84 
EBA_TESTED●EBTP●DY2011 ± - - - - 0.188724* 1.86 
EBA_TESTED●TIER1●DY2010 ± - - - - -0.000031 -0.21 
EBA_TESTED●TIER1●DY2011 ± - - - - 0.000079 0.45 
Panel B: Model fit     
F-statistics  64.29*** 43.78*** 32.91*** 
Within R
2   0.4972 0.5045 0.5118 
Between R
2   0.3695 0.3275 0.3173 
Overall R
2  0.4015 0.3736 0.3710 
Number of observations  998 998 998 
The table reports the results of the GLS fixed effect (FE) estimates of equations (1), (2) and (3). In each regression the dependent variable is LLP. 
28EBA_TESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if bank i is one of the 28 banks subject to both the 2010 and 2011, and 0 otherwise; DY2010 
(DY2011) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is referred to the year 2010 (2011), and 0 otherwise. See Table 1 for the other variables 
definition. T-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 
 Table 7 
Two-step system GMM regression results for loan loss provisions. 
  Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) 
Variables/ratios  Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates        
Constant  -.000935 2.01 .000345 0.62 .000191 0.40 
GDPGR 
 
-.013778*** -4.56 -.013238*** -4.87 
-
.012713*** -4.41 
NPL  .097660*** 3.47 .098048*** 3.73 .098409*** 3.15 
LOAN 
 
-.006410*** -2.81 -.0059698*** -2.61 
-
.006059*** -2.60 
EBTP  .133690*** 5.42 .1156504*** 4.40 .113676*** 4.48 
TIER1  -.000046 -1.10 -.000014 -0.30 .000009 0.15 
CRISIS●EBTP  .028324*** 2.57 .029485** 1.96 .0298843* 1.91 
CRISIS●TIER1  -.0000673* -1.93 -.000072 -1.60 -.000073 -1.38 
LISTED●EBTP  - - .093819 1.34 .070785 1.12 
LISTED●EBTP●CRISIS  - - -.042031 -0.59 -.031941 -0.48 
LISTED●TIER1  - - -.000231 -1.00 -.000147 -0.73 
LISTED●TIER1●CRISIS  - - .000166 0.68 .0001189 0.54 
EBA_TESTED●2010  - - - - -.006956** -1.98 
EBA_TESTED●2011  - - - - -.016033** -2.20 
EBA_TESTED●EBTP●2010  - - - - .131085 1.19 
EBA_TESTED●EBTP●2011  - - - - .292504** 2.21 
EBA_TESTED●TIER1●2010  - - - - .0000350 1.46 
EBA_TESTED●TIER1●2011  - - - - .000768 1.48 
Panel B: Model fit     
F-statistics  89.97*** 75.31*** 80.06*** 
test stat AR(1)  -3.64*** (0.00) -3.59***(0.00) -3.57***(0.00) 
test stat AR(2)  -0.39 (0.699) -0.08 (0.940) -0.16(0.870) 
Hansen J-stat  186.63 (0.432) 180.76 (0.574) 182.80(0.449) 
Number of instruments  197 202 204 
Number of observations  818 818 818 
The table shows the two-step system GMM estimation of equations (1), (2) and (3). In each regression 
the dependent variable is LLP. 28EBA_TESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if bank 
i is one of the 28 banks subject to both the 2010 and 2011, and 0 otherwise; DY2010 (DY2011) is an 
indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is referred to the year 2010 (2011), and 0 
otherwise. See Table 1 for the other variables definition. p-values are in parentheses. AR(1) and 
AR(2) test for no serial correlation of first and second order, in the first differenced standard errors. 
Hansen j-stat tests for over-identifying restrictions. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ express significance at 1, 5 and 
10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
